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Abstract
Background: A person is less likely to be accurately remembered if they appear in a visual scene with a gun, a result that has
been termed the weapon focus effect (WFE). Explanations of the WFE argue that weapons engage attention because they
are unusual and/or threatening, which causes encoding deficits for the other items in the visual scene. Previous WFE
research has always embedded the weapon and nonweapon objects within a larger context that provides information
about an actor’s intention to use the object. As such, it is currently unknown whether a gun automatically engages
attention to a greater extent than other objects independent of the context in which it is presented.
Method: Reflexive responding to a gun compared to other objects was examined in two experiments. Experiment 1
employed a prosaccade gap-overlap paradigm, whereby participants looked toward a peripheral target, and Experiment 2
employed an antisaccade gap-overlap paradigm, whereby participants looked away from a peripheral target. In both
experiments, the peripheral target was a gun or a nonthreatening object (i.e., a tomato or pocket watch). We also controlled
how unexpected the targets were and compared saccadic reaction times across types of objects.
Results: A gun was not found to differentially engage attention compared to the unexpected object (i.e., a pocket watch).
Some evidence was found (Experiment 2) that both the gun and the unexpected object engaged attention to a greater
extent compared the expected object (i.e., a tomato).
Conclusion: An image of a gun did not engage attention to a larger extent than images of other types of objects (i.e., a
pocket watch or tomato). The results suggest that context may be an important determinant of WFE. The extent to which
an object is threatening may depend on the larger context in which it is presented.
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Introduction
Approximately one-quarter of violent crimes in the UK and the
USA involve the use of a weapon [1], [2]. Evidence suggests that
victims are less likely to sustain physical injury if the perpetrator
commits the crime with compared to without a weapon [3]. If
injury is sustained, however, it is more likely to be lethal in crimes
committed by perpetrators with weapons, with the likelihood of
death being 40 times higher if the crime is committed with a gun
as opposed to without a weapon [4]. As such, it is perhaps
unsurprising that people’s fear of dying in a gun related incident
outpaces their actual risk [5].
Observing a weapon during a crime can also impact memory
for the incident. Research presenting crime scenarios to laboratory
participants has found that people are generally less likely to
remember details about criminal perpetrators who wield weapons,
a result that has been termed the weapon focus effect (WFE). In the
seminal study that demonstrated the WFE, participants were
shown a slide sequence that varied across participants in whether
the criminal perpetrator was shown holding a check or a gun [6].
Results indicated that in the gun compared to the check condition,
participants fixated more on the object, produced more erroneous
descriptions of the perpetrator, and were less likely to identify him
from a target present photo lineup. The bulk of subsequent
research has confirmed WFE, finding that people are less likely to
accurately remember a person when a weapon is present during
encoding [7].
The psychological mechanism underlying the WFE, however, is
debated in the literature. The arousal hypothesis was the first account
put forth to explain the WFE, and it maintains that seeing a
weapon causes an observer to experience arousal, which narrows
the observer’s focus of attention to the weapon [8], [9], [10]. As a
result, attention is less likely to be directed towards visual stimuli
that are peripheral to the weapon, such as the perpetrator.
Consequently, observers are less likely to encode and remember
information about the perpetrator’s physical appearance when a
weapon is present. The arousal conceptualisation of the WFE is in
keeping with Easterbrook’s [11] cue-utilisation model, which posits
that arousal restricts the focus of attention to the most immediate
or central cues in the environment. Additionally, preferential
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processing of threats has been demonstrated with a range of
stimuli. People are faster to detect threat-related targets, such as
snakes, spiders and angry faces, compared to neutral targets [12],
[13], [14], [15]. [16], an effect that is known in the literature as the
threat superiority effect. Preferential visual processing of threat-related
stimuli is arguably adaptive from an evolutionary perspective. We
may be biologically prepared, therefore, to fear the stimuli that
posed a threat to the survival of our early ancestors (e.g., snakes
and spiders). Therefore phylogenetic threat-related stimuli may
have visual processing priority over ontogenetic threat-stimuli
(e.g., guns, electric outlets) and neutral stimuli [17]. However,
more recent work contrasting the detection of phylogenetic (e.g.,
spiders, snakes) and ontogenetic threat-related stimuli using a
visual search paradigm has not found differences in detection
speed for phylogenetic and ontogenetic threat-related stimuli,
suggesting that that both ancient and recent threats are
preferentially processed over nonthreatening stimuli [18], [19],
[20]. Still further, perhaps the threat-value of a stimulus is not the
main determinant of the speed with which a stimulus is detected;
rather, the subjective relevance of a stimulus in a given context
may be the driving force that predicts detection speed [21], [22].
The unusual object hypothesis, another account of the WFE, also
focuses on context as a determinant, arguing that weapons draw
attention not because they are threatening, but rather because they
are unusual or unexpected in most contexts [23], [24]. In other
research domains, unexpected as opposed to expected objects have
been found to draw visual attention to a greater extent (e.g., [25]).
With respect to the WFE, Mitchell et al. [24] tested the unusual
hypothesis by presenting participants with a slide sequence in
which a man removed from his briefcase nothing (i.e., control
condition), a gun, or an unexpected object, which was a stick of
celery. Memory performance was poorer in the celery and gun
conditions relative to the control condition. The threat hypothesis
would not predict these results. Thus, these findings suggest that
the WFE occurs because weapons draw attention not because they
are threatening but rather because in most contexts they are
unexpected. Indeed, research has shown that weapons differen-
tially engage attention depending on whether they are presented in
a context in which it would be unusual to see a weapon. For
example, Pickel [26] had participants view scenarios in which an
observer would expect to see a weapon (i.e., a shooting range) or in
a context in which observers would not expect to see a weapon
(i.e., at a baseball field). Memory performance was worse when the
weapon appeared in the unexpected context, thereby supporting
the unusual object over the arousal hypothesis.
However, another possibility is that both the arousal hypothesis
and the unusual object hypothesis are correct. In particular,
although unusual objects command greater attention than
expected objects, when a weapon is unexpected it might command
greater attention compared to another unexpected object because
of a weapon’s inherently threatening nature. To illustrate, Hope
and Wright [27] presented a slideshow of a simulated crime in
which the target was holding a weapon, an unusual object, or a
control object. While the slideshow was being presented,
participants were required to monitor numbers that appeared in
a corner of the screen and to press a key when an odd number
appeared. Thereafter, memory for the slideshow was tested.
Results indicated impaired performance for the weapon and
unusual object conditions relative to the control condition.
Memory impairment, however, was worse in the weapon
compared to the unusual object condition, suggesting that the
weapon engaged attention to a greater extent compared to the
unusual object. In keeping with these results, a recent meta-
analysis of the WFE literature by Fawcett and colleagues [7] found
support for both the arousal and the unusual object hypotheses.
Memory performance across studies was negatively impacted by
weapons and unusual objects to the same extent. However, the
WFE was larger in studies that employed threatening as opposed
to nonthreatening scenarios. Fawcett and colleagues proposed that
there are two possible interpretations of the results. First, the
results could indicate that both weapon and unusual objects
generate arousal. Weapons could cause arousal due to their
threatening nature, whereas unusual objects cause arousal because
they are surprising. Arousal, whether induced by threat or
surprise, narrows attention and reduces the probability that
peripheral information is encoded. Second, the results may
indicate that both arousal and unusualness impact performance.
In summary, extant data support the hypothesis that a weapon
may engage attention either because it is viewed as threatening as
well as the hypothesis that a weapon engages attention because it is
unexpected.
One assumption made by all WFE theories is that weapons are
drawing attention automatically. Although the results of previous
studies are consistent with this stimulus-driven or bottom up
depiction of attention, the results are also consistent with attention
being purposefully directed to the weapons because of the goals of
the observer. In a crime, safety would be a fundamental goal that
might override all others, and hence, attention might be directed
to the weapon to appraise the threat. Additionally, to the degree
that weapons draw attention because of their unexpected nature, it
can be argued that attention is top-down because of the
importance of re-evaluating a situation that has not unfolded as
expected (e.g., see [28]).
The first goal of the present study was to investigate whether
weapons, in their own right, outside of a context of an unfolding
event that may influence threat appraisal, attract visual attention
to a greater extent than unusual and usual objects. The second
goal was to investigate whether the effect of a weapon on attention
is primarily goal-directed or stimulus-driven. If the threatening
nature of weapons draws attention automatically, attention will be
engaged more by weapons than unusual or usual objects. Here, we
define automatic as an involuntary process. Weapons may be
inherently threatening because their portrayal by the media has
led them to become ontogenetically conditioned stimuli that elicit
a conditioned fear response. Previous WFE research has always
embedded the weapon and nonweapon objects within a larger
context, which in turn could affect threat appraisals about the
object. As such, we presently do not know whether weapons, when
presented alone—without a larger context that would provide
information regarding the intentions of an actor to use the
weapon—differentially engage attention compared to nonthreat-
ening objects. Additionally, the only studies that have measured
visual behaviour in response to a weapon have used paradigms,
such as visual search tasks, that cannot distinguish well between
goal-directed versus involuntary attention [18], [19], [20]. What is
more, the only WFE study that has examined whether weapons
automatically engage attention presented the to-be-remembered
target who was wielding a gun (or a book), for 30 s, and then
assessed memory for the target and the object [28,29]. Visual
attention, however, was not measured at the onset of exposure to
the object; hence, whether participants automatically attended to
the object when it appeared could not be assessed. Additionally,
the automatic vs. goal-directed nature of attentional guidance is
best explored using a paradigm in which the investigator can
manipulate whether attentional guidance by stimulus properties is
in competition with task goals. For this reason, the present study
used the gap/overlap pro/anti-saccade paradigm, which is a
standard approach for measuring attentional engagement.
Weapon Focus Effect
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The gap-overlap paradigm is illustrated in Figure 1. On gap
trials, there is a 200 ms time gap between the presentation of a
central fixation cross and a peripheral target onscreen. On overlap
trials, the fixation cross is not removed before peripheral target
presentation; therefore, the fixation cross and the target overlap.
Participants are instructed to either look toward (pro-saccade) or
away (anti-saccade) from the peripheral target. Saccadic reaction
times (SRTs) are shorter on gap compared to overlap trials. When
comparing gap trials with overlap trials, the difference in SRTs
occurs because of disengagement costs: namely, in the overlap
condition, attention must be disengaged from the central fixation
before being shifted onto the peripheral target.
In this paradigm, top-down attention is controlled by task
instruction and bottom-up attention is controlled by the inherent
attentional draw of the peripheral target [30]. When comparing
prosaccades and antisaccade trials, prosaccades should be
relatively fast because top-down and bottom-up attention both
guide the eyes to the target. Antisaccades should be slower
between top-down attentional guidance must overcome bottom-up
attentional guidance for the participant to successfully look away
from the target.
In gap trials, bottom-up attention quickly guides the eyes. In
overlap trials, on the other hand, attention must be disengaged
from the fixation cross before the eyes can move, so saccades are
generally slower. If the bottom-up attentional pull of the target is
particularly strong, that disengagement will happen faster than if
the bottom-up attentional pull is weaker.
Experiment 1 employed a prosaccade gap-overlap paradigm:
participants were instructed to look toward a peripheral target,
which was either a weapon (i.e., a gun),an expected object
nonthreatening object (i.e., a tomato), or unexpected nonthreat-
ening object (i.e., a pocket watch). The frequency with which the
target was presented was manipulated to vary how expected the
object was. As the task is the same for all object types, voluntary
attention should be equivalent for all. What could differ is
involuntary attention. If one object type elicits more reflexive
attention, then prosaccades should be quicker for those objects.
Under the unexpected object hypothesis, both the gun and pocket
watch objects should engage reflexive attention more than the
tomato. As such, SRTs should be shorter for the gun and pocket
watch object condition compared to the tomato condition. On the
other hand, if a gun draws attention because of its threatening
nature, then reflexive attention should be engaged more for a gun
compared to both a pocket watch and tomato, as would be
predicted by the arousal hypothesis.
In Experiment 2, an antisaccade paradigm was used: partici-
pants were instructed to look away from the target. In the
antisaccade paradigm, reflexive attention draws the eyes to the
target whereas voluntary attention directs the eyes away from the
target. As in the prosaccade paradigm, voluntary attention should
be equivalent for all objects, so any differences between
antisaccades should reflect reflexive attention. If a gun attracts
attention because of they are unexpected, then SRTs for a gun and
a pocket watch objects should be longer compared to a tomoto,
especially in the gap condition. On the other hand, if a gun draws
attention because of its inherently threatening nature, then SRTs
for a gun compared to the other objects should be longer.
Experiment 1: Prosaccade Gap-Overlap Paradigm
Method
Ethics Statement. The research protocol was reviewed and
approved by the University of Leicester School of Psychology
Research Ethics Committee. Written informed consent was
obtained from participants directly, prior to their participation.
All participants were adults over the age of 18.
Participants. 34 students (M age = 19.47, SD=2.85 years;
n = 27 female) from the University of Leicester volunteered. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All
participants were over the age of 18.
Materials. Targets were black and white photographs of
weapon, expected, and unexpected objects. The weapon was a
handgun, the expected object was a tomato, and the unexpected
object was a pocket watch. These objects were selected following a
pretest, which presented participants with a number of objects and
assessed whether participants could name the object and how
frequently they held the object on a typical day. The aim was to
select for the experiment 1) objects were approximately equally
familiar across object categories, and 2) unexpected and weapon
objects that were equally likely to be infrequently held by the
participant. Candidate objects on the list for the unexpected
category included a bowling skittle (pin), a Rubik’s Twist, a life
ring, a pocket watch, and a crown; the candidate weapon objects
were a shotgun, a grenade, a handgun, and a knife; the candidate
expected objects were common fruits and vegetables (e.g., tomato,
lettuce, onion). The results of the pretesting indicated that a
handgun and pocket watch were equally familiar to participants
and infrequently held. The tomato was selected as the expected
object because it was held more often than the other expected
objects. We did not include additional exemplars within categories
because so doing increased within category variability with respect
to familiarity for unexpected nonthreatening objects but not for
unexpected threatening objects. Namely, there was larger
variability across unexpected nonthreatening objects in familiarity,
because more of our participants had direct contact with these
items compared to weapons. We were concerned that differences
in familiarity across the unexpected threatening and nonthreaten-
Figure 1. Illustration of the gap/overlap paradigm.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081011.g001
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ing conditions would impact attentional engagement; therefore, we
elected to use one exemplar for each object category.
The tomato was 100 by 104 pixels, the handgun was 119689
pixels, and the pocket watch was 120 by 88 pixels in size.
Procedure
The session began by calibrating the eye tracking system, which
was an Eye Link II desk mounted tracker (SR Research Ltd.,
Ontario) that collects 250 measurements per second. Head
movements were minimized by the use of a chin rest, and thereby
maintained viewing distance to 57 cm. To calibrate the eye-
tracker’s measurement of eye-position, the participant twice made
fixations on nine sequentially appearing dots that had positions
spanning the full range of the display. The eye-tracker was
assumed to be calibrated successfully if the fixation positions
recorded in the second sequence were within 0.70 degrees of visual
angle of that predicted from measurements in the first sequence.
Participants were told to focus their eyes on the fixation cross
and then saccade toward the target when it appeared. A within
participants design was used to vary the experimental factors,
which included object type (gun, pocket watch and tomato) and
trial type (gap and overlap).
For the gap trials, the fixation cross was turned off and 200 ms
later a randomly selected target was presented approximately 14
degrees from the fixation cross on the left or right side of the screen
for 1500 ms. For the overlap trials, the fixation cross remained
onscreen during target presentation.
There were 100 trials in total; the expected object was presented
on 76 trials, the weapon on 16 trials and the unexpected object for
16 trials, with target trial order randomized. The relative
frequency of the different target types was instituted to ensure
that the pocket watch and gun retained their status as objects that
are less frequently encountered compared to the expected object
over the course of the experiment.
Data analysis
The eye tracker measured when participants began a saccade
after target onset. In order to be included in the analysis, the
saccade had to begin within 0.50 degree of the fixation cross, and
the SRT had to be between 80 and 500 ms following
recommended practice [31]. The saccade also had to land within
7 degrees of the target [32]. For each participant, average SRT
was computed by object type for the gap and the overlap
conditions. Additionally, the error rate, or the rate at which
participants looked away rather than toward the object, was
calculated across conditions for each participant.
Results
The error rate did not vary across object conditions. The error
rate (M= .03) was exactly the same for each of the object
conditions. As such, the error rate data were not analysed further.
The SRT data were analysed with a 2 (trial condition: gap
versus overlap)63 (object type: weapon, unexpected, expected)
repeated measures ANOVA; descriptive statistics are given in
Table 1. A main effect for condition was obtained, with faster
SRTs in the gap compared to overlap condition, F(1, 33) = 33.28,
p,.001, gp
2 = .50. A main effect was also obtained for object type
(weapon M=339.46, unexpected M=331.84, expected
M=340.51), F(2, 66) = 4.54, p,.05, gp
2 = .12. SRTs were faster
in the unexpected object condition (M=331.84) compared to the
expected condition (M=340.51), t(33) = 3.66, p,.001.The differ-
ence in SRTs between the unexpected object and weapon
conditions was not statistically significant, t(33) = 1.93, p= .06,
two-tailed. The interaction between condition and object type was
not significant (F= .04), indicating that the size of the gap effect
did not vary in relation to object type.
SRTs were also examined as a function of trial number to
determine whether early responses to weapons and unusual objects
differed compared to later responses. This analysis was undertaken
to check whether attention to unusual objects and weapons was
engaged to a greater extent earlier in the trial sequence when they
were the most unexpected. Results indicated that SRTs did not
systematically differ across the trials, suggesting that attentional
engagement to the object did not wane as the number of exposures
to the object increased.
Discussion
The aim of the experiment was to test whether a gun engaged
attention faster compared to an unexpected object (i.e., a pocket
watch) and expected objects (i.e., a tomato). A standard gap effect
was found, whereby attention was engaged faster on gap
compared to overlap trials. The results further indicated that
attentional engagement was not greater for a gun compared to the
expected object. Interestingly, SRTs were the fastest for the
unexpected object. Thus, a gun, when presented on its own
without a context, did not attract attention faster than the
nonthreatening stimuli that were employed.
Experiment 2 was conducted to determine whether the
tendency to look toward objects was greater for a gun compared
to an unexpected object and an expected object. An antisaccade
gap-overlap paradigm was employed toward this end. The target
was presented on the left or right side of a computer screen, and
participants were instructed to look away from the target to the
target’s mirror position. If a gun automatically engages attention
because of its inherently threatening nature, SRTs should be
longer for a gun as opposed to an unexpected object and an
expected object, especially on gap trials. The antisaccade gap-
Table 1. Group means and standard errors (SEM) of the saccadic reaction times (SRT) by object condition (weapon, expected and
control) and trial type (gap and overlap) in Experiment 2, which employed the prosaccade gap-overlap paradigm.
Trial Condition Overall
gap overlap
weapon expected unexpected weapon expected unexpected weapon expected unexpected
Mean 330.81 332.07 323.98 348.13 348.95 339.71 339.46 340.51 331.84
SEM 5.57 4.86 4.88 5.04 5.04 6.28 4.73 4.69 5.06
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081011.t001
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overlap paradigm measures the ability to supress looking towards
an object. If a gun engages attention due to its threatening nature,
suppression should be more challenging if the object is a weapon
compared to an unexpected nonthreatening object or expected
nonthreatening object. The unexpected item hypothesis was also
tested. If a gun automatically attract attention because it is
unexpected, then SRTs for a gun should be longer compared to an
expected object. Additionally, this second study gave us the
opportunity to again compare SRTs across the gun and
unexpected object, as the difference between these objects
approached statistical significance in Study 1.
Experiment 2: Antisaccade Gap-Overlap Paradigm
Method
Ethics Statement. The research protocol was reviewed and
approved by the University of Leicester School of Psychology
Research Ethics Committee. Written informed consent was
obtained from participants directly, prior to their participation.
All participants were adults over the age of 18.
Participants. 29 staff and students (M age= 27.48, SD=8.07
years; n = 15 female) from the University of Leicester volunteered.
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials, Procedure, and Data Analysis. The stimulus
materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 except
that participants were asked to look away from the target when it
appeared. Data analysis proceeded in the same manner as
Experiment 1.
Results
The error rate did not vary across trial condition or object
categories: The error rate for the gap condition was 20% and for
the overlap condition 18%, and the error rate was 20% for the
gun, 19% for the tomato object condition, and 20% for the pocket
watch object condition. These rates of error are within the range
expected; the typical error rate for the antisaccade gap-overlap
task is 20% [33]. Error trials were excluded from the SRT data
analysis.
The SRT data were entered into a 3 (object type: weapon,
unexpected, expected)62 (condition: gap or overlap) repeated
measures ANOVA. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. A
significant main effect was found for condition, with slower SRTs
found for the overlap compared to gap condition (M=381.85
versus M=365.03), F(1,28) = 8.79, p,.01, gp
2 = .24. Additionally,
SRTs significantly varied depending on object type, F(2,56) = 3.43,
p,.01, gp
2 = .11. SRTs for the gun and pocket watch did not
differ on average, and the means were nearly identical (M=377.29
versus M=377.59 ms). SRTs were shorter for the tomato when
compared to each of the other object conditions (tomato
M=365.43 ms versus gun M=377.29 ms, t(28) = 3.52, p,.01;
and tomato M=365.43 ms versus pocket watch M=377.59 ms:
t(28) = 2.11, p,.05.) The size of the gap effect did not vary across
object type, as the interaction between condition and object type
was not statistically significant (F= .12).
SRTs were also examined as a function of trial number to
determine whether early responses to weapons and unusual objects
differed compared to later responses. SRTs did not systematically
vary across trials.
Discussion
Previous research designed to test the cause of the WFE has
presented the weapon and control objects within a broader
context. This research has varied the type of object carried by
someone in a hypothetical scenario (e.g., [6]) or varied across
hypothetical scenarios how expected a weapon would be across the
given contexts (e.g., [23]). In both of these types of experimental
designs, the context may be affecting differential reactions to the
objects presented. Specifically, appraisals regarding the threat-
value of a given object may require an assessment of the object in
relation to the broader context in which it is presented.
Additionally, the one study to date that has sought to examine
attentional capture presented the perpetrator for 30 s [28].
Consequently, whether weapons immediately engage attention
when presented is currently not known. Our aim in the present
study was to examine whether a gun would engage attention faster
compared to a nonthreatening object, controlling for the
unusualness of the object, and to test whether that engagement
was due to bottom-up or top-down direction of attention.
According to the arousal hypothesis, a gun should automatically
engage attention faster compared to a nonthreatening object.
Alternatively, if both a gun and an unusual object attract attention
faster than an expected object, then support would be found for
the unusual object hypothesis.
To test our aim, Experiment 1 employed a prosaccade gap-
overlap paradigm, testing whether saccadic response time (SRT) is
faster on average for a gun compared to an unusual (i.e.,
unexpected) nonthreatening object and an usual (i.e., expected)
nonthreatening object. The experimental set-up ensured that the
usual object, which was a tomato, was relatively more expected
than the unusual object, which was a pocket watch; the usual
object was presented on 76% of the trials whereas the unusual
object and gun were presented on only 12% of the trials. If
weapons are inherently threatening, the gun should have attracted
greater attention than the nonthreatening objects after controlling
for unusualness. A standard gap effect was found, whereby SRTs
were faster for the gap compared to overlap conditions. The size of
the gap effect was not moderated by object type, however.
Attention was not directed towards a gun any faster than the
tomato or a pocket watch. Instead, SRTs were faster in the tomato
object compared to the gun, and though not statistically
Table 2. Group means and standard errors of the saccadic reaction times (SRT) by object condition (weapon, expected and
control) and trial type (gap and overlap) in Experiment 2, which employed the antisaccade gap-overlap paradigm.
Trial Type Overall
Gap overlap
weapon expected Unexpected weapon expected unexpected weapon expected unexpected
Mean 383.84 367.25 376.71 402.42 383.58 398.11 377.29 365.43 377.59
SEM 9.10 7.30 9.33 11.65 6.51 10.34 7.37 5.91 7.16
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081011.t002
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significant, SRTs were faster for the pocket watch compared to the
gun.
In Experiment 2, an antisaccade gap-overlap paradigm was
used, whereby participants were instructed to look away from the
object to its mirror position. Once again, a gap effect was found,
but object type did not moderate the size of the gap effect. The
results indicated longer SRTs for both the gun and the unusual
object (i.e., pocket watch) compared to the usual object (i.e.,
tomato). SRTs did not differ for the gun compared to the unusual
object, however. When presented alone, a gun was found to draw
attention to the same extent as an unusual but nonthreatening
object. Thus, the results disconfirm the hypothesis that weapons
engage attention to a greater extent than other objects simply
because they are inherently threatening.
The results of this study found no evidence that a gun attracts
attention more than an unexpected or an expected object. Given
the null results, our findings should be viewed cautiously and, of
course, future research should be undertaken to replicate and
extend the current paradigm. For instance, a single example of
each kind of object was used in this study in order to maximize
some characteristics previously uncontrolled in the WFE literature,
but future studies should attempt to use other examples of
weapons and unusual and usual objects. Although we controlled
for variability of the stimuli within each type (by using only one
example) and familiarity of the stimuli between types, it may be
that other weapons would appear more threatening to participants
than the gun we used.
Despite the tentative conclusions that can be drawn, this study
nevertheless adds to the growing body of evidence demonstrating
that whether a weapon or any object attracts attention depends on
the larger context in which it is presented. Once embedded in a
context, a weapon may engage attention because it is either
unexpected or threatening [23], [24]. These findings are
compatible with the view that stimuli gain priority in visual
processing depending on their relevance in a given context [21],
[22]. In this study, an unexpected weapon object did not draw
attention to a greater extent than a nonthreatening unexpected
object. Instead, an unexpected object, whether it was a weapon or
a nonthreatening object, drew attention to a greater extent than an
expected object. This may have occurred because attention
automatically orients to novel objects in the visual environment
(see [34], [35]). Future research should seek to replicate this
finding and further explore the role of relevance in visual
processing. Given that support has been found for both the
unusual object hypothesis and the arousal hypothesis across the
literature, additional work is needed to examine how threat-value
and unusualness may work in concert to produce the WFE. In
particular, as suggested by Fawcett and colleagues [7], both
weapon and unusual objects might generate arousal, but for
different reasons. Arousal, whether caused by threat (in the case of
a weapon) or surprise (in the case of a weapon or an unusual
object), narrows attention and reduces the probability that
peripheral information is encoded. Additionally, it is also
important to emphasize that the WFE seems to be context
sensitive. As such, the size of the gap effect in relation to whether
an object is threatening or unusual is probably also sensitive to
context and top down processing effects.
At the start of this project, we hypothesized that a gun might
capture attention even when presented alone without a context.
Specifically, a gun may serve as a conditioned stimulus that causes
arousal and captures attention. Since a gun is often paired with
violence, the mere presentation of a photograph of a gun may
elicit a fear response. The results of these two studies, however,
were not in keeping with that hypothesis. Instead, the data suggest
that people may be desensitized to digital presentations of
weapons. Violent media are ubiquitous (e.g., [36]), and some
researchers estimate that by the time a child is 12 years old, they
will have seen more than 8,000 murders in (mostly simulated)
digital formats [37]. To illustrate further, a recent content analysis
of video game advertisements found that 68% of trailer and over
50% of print advertisements displayed a weapon, with the most
common type of weapon being a gun [38]. Perhaps frequent
media exposure to guns and other weapons has desensitized
people to digital depictions of weapons, and consequently, a mere
exposure to a photograph of a weapon no longer causes arousal.
Nearly all of the research on the WFE measures responses to
digital presentations of a weapon. Although the WFE has been
found for both digital and live presentations, further work is
needed to examine the effects of live weapon exposure on WFE. A
weapon may be appraised, of course, as more threatening when
presented in a live as opposed to digital context; therefore, the size
of the WFE in remembering objects peripheral to the weapon may
be larger in a live context. Further work is needed to examine
these outstanding questions.
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